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Comparative Statics via Stochastic Orderings in
a Two-Echelon Market with Upstream Demand
Uncertainty
Constandina Koki and Stefanos Leonardos and Costis Melolidakis
Abstract We revisit the classic Cournot model and extend it to a two-echelon supply
chain with an upstream supplier who operates under demand uncertainty and mul-
tiple downstream retailers who compete over quantity. The supplier’s belief about
retail demand is modeled via a continuous probability distribution function F . If
F has the decreasing generalized mean residual life (DGMRL) property, then the
supplier’s optimal pricing policy exists and is the unique fixed point of the mean
residual life (MRL) function. This closed form representation of the supplier’s equi-
librium strategy facilitates a transparent comparative statics and sensitivity analysis.
We utilize the theory of stochastic orderings to study the response of the equilib-
rium fundamentals – wholesale price, retail price and quantity – to varying demand
distribution parameters. We examine supply chain performance, in terms of the dis-
tribution of profits, supply chain efficiency, in terms of the Price of Anarchy, and
complement our findings with numerical results.
1 Introduction
The global character of modern markets necessitates the study of competition mod-
els that capture two features: first, that retailers’ cost is not constant but rather
formed as the decision variable of a strategic, profit-maximizing supplier, and sec-
ond that uncertainty about retail demand affects not only the retailers but also the
supplier. Motivated by these considerations, in [10], we use a game-theoretic ap-
proach to extend the classic Cournot market in the following two-stage game: in the
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first-stage (acting as a Stackelberg leader), a revenue-maximizing supplier sets the
wholesale price of a product under incomplete information about market demand.
Demand or equivalently, the supplier’s belief about it, is modeled via a continuous
probability distribution. In the second-stage, the competing retailers observe whole-
sale price and realized market demand and engage in a classic Cournot competition.
Retail price is determined by an affine inverse demand function.
[8] studied a similar model in which demand uncertainty affected a single re-
tailer. They identified the property of increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) as
a mild unimodality condition for the deterministic supplier’s revenue-function and
then performed an extensive comparative statics and performance (efficiency) anal-
ysis of the supply chain at equilibrium. The properties of IGFR random variables
were studied in a series of subsequent notes, [9],[3] and [12].
In [10], we extended the work of [8] by moving uncertainty to the supplier and by
implementing an arbitrary number of second-stage retailers. We introduced the gen-
eralized mean residual life (GMRL) function of the supplier’s belief distribution F
and showed that his stochastic revenue function is unimodal, if the GMRL function
is decreasing – (DGMRL) property – and F has finite second moment. In this case,
we characterized the supplier’s optimal price as a fixed point of his mean residual
life (MRL) function, see Theorem 1 below. Subsequently, we turned our attention
to DGMRL random variables, examined their moments, limiting behavior, closure
properties and established their relation to IGFR random variables, as in [9], [3] and
[12]. This study was done in expense of a comparative statistics and performance
analysis, as the one in Sections 3-5 of [8]. The importance of such an analyis is
underlined among others in [1],[2],[6] and references therein.
1.1 Contributions – Outline:
The present paper aims to fill this gap. Following the methodology of [8], we study
the response of maket fundamentals by utilizing the closed form characterization of
the equilibrium obtained in [10]. Specifically, under the conditions of Theorem 1,
the optimal wholesale price is the unique fixed point of the MRL function of the
demand distribution F . This motivates the study of conditions under which two
different markets, denoted by F1 and F2, can be ordered in the mrl-stochastic order,
see [14].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the model descrip-
tion and in Section 3, the existing results from [10] on which the current analysis
is based. Our findings, both analytical and numerical are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes our analysis and discusses directions for future work.
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1.1.1 Comparison to Related Works
Two-echelon markets have been extensively studied in the literature under differ-
ent perspectives and various levels of demand uncertainty, see e.g. [5], [11], [15]
and [16]. In the present study, we depart from previous works by introducing the
toolbox of stochastic orderings in the comparative statics analysis. The advantage
of this approach is that we quantify economic notions, such as market size and de-
mand variability, in various ways. Accordingly, we are able to challenge established
economic intuitions by showing, for instance, that repsonses of wholesale prices
to increasing market size or demand variability are not easy to perdict, since they
largely depend on the notion of variability that is employed.
2 The Model: Game-Theoretic Formulation
An upstream supplier produces a single homogeneous good at constant marginal
cost, normalized to 0, and sells it to a set of N = {1,2, . . . ,n} downstream retailers.
The supplier has ample quantity to cover any possible demand and his only decision
variable is the wholesale price r which he determines prior to and independently of
the retailers’ order-decisions. The retailers observe r – a price-only contract (there
is no return option and the salvage value of the product is zero) – as well as the
market demand parameter α and choose simultaneously and independently their
order-quantities qi (r | α) , i∈N. They face no uncertainty about the demand and the
quantity that they order from the supplier is equal to the quantity that they sell to the
market (at equilibrium). The retail price is determined by an affine inverse demand
function p = (α−q(r))+, where α is the demand parameter and q(r) :=∑ni=1 qi (r)
is the total quantity that the retailers release to the market1. Contrary to the retailers,
we assume that at the point of his decision, the supplier has incomplete information
about the actual market demand.
This supply chain can be represented as a two-stage game, in which the supplier
acts in the first stage and the retailers in the second. A strategy for the supplier is a
price r≥ 0 and a strategy for retailer i is a function qi :R+→R+, which specifies the
quantity that retailer i will order for any possible cost r. Payoffs are determined via
the strategy profile (r,q(r)), where q(r) = (qi (r))ni=1. Given cost r, the profit func-
tion pii (q(r) | r) or simply pii (q | r), of retailer i∈N, is pii (q | r)= qi (α−q)+−rqi.
For a given value of α , the supplier’s profit function, pis is pis (r | α) = rq(r) for
0≤ r < α , where q(r) depends on α via pii (q | r).
To model the supplier’s uncertainty about retail demand, we assume that after
the pricing decision of the supplier, but prior to the order-decisions of the retailers,
a value for α is realized from a continuous distribution F , with finite mean Eα <
+∞ and nonnegative values, i.e. F (0) = 0. Equivalently, F can be thought of as
the supplier’s belief about the demand parameter and, hence, about the retailers’
1 To simplify notation, we write q or q(r) and qi or qi (r) instead of the proper q(r | α) and
qi (r | α).
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willingness-to-pay his price. We will use the notation F¯ := 1−F for the survival
function and αL := sup{r ≥ 0 : F (r) = 0} ≥ 0, αH := inf{r ≥ 0 : F (r) = 1} ≤+∞
for the support of F respectively. Under these assumptions, the supplier’s payoff
function pis becomes stochastic: pis (r) = Epis (r | α). All the above are assumed to
be common knowledge among the participants in the market (the supplier and the
retailers).
3 Existing Results
We consider only subgame perfect equilibria, i.e. strategy profiles (r,q(r)) such that
q(r) is an equilibrium in the second stage and qi (r) is a best response against any
r for all i = 1,2, . . . ,n. The equilibrium behavior of this market has been analyzed
in [10]. To proceed with the equilibrium representation, we first introduce some
notation.
3.1 Generalized Mean Residual Life:
Let α ∼ F be a nonnegative random variable with finite expectation Eα <+∞. The
mean residual life (MRL) function m(r) of α is defined as
m(r) := E(α− r | α > r) = 1
F¯ (r)
∫ ∞
r
F¯ (u)du, for r < αH
and m(r) := 0, otherwise, see, e.g., [4], [7] or [14]. In analogy to the generalized
failure rate (GFR) function g(r) := rh(r), where h(r) := f (r)/F¯ (r) denotes the
hazard rate of F and the increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) unimodality con-
dition, defined in [8] and studied in [9],[3], we introduce, see [10], the generalized
mean residual life (GMRL) function `(r), defined as `(r) := m(r)r , for 0 < r < αH .
If `(r) is decreasing, then F has the (DGMRL) property. The relationship between
the (IGFR) and (DGMRL) classes of random variables is studied in [10].
We will use the notation DMRL for a random variable X with a decreasing mean
residual life function m(r) and IFR for a random variable X with increasing failure
rate h(r). We say that X1 is smaller than X2 in the mean residual life order, denoted
as X1 ≤mrl X2, if m1 (r) ≤ m2 (r) for all r, see [14]. Of course m1 (r) ≤ m2 (r) if
and only if `1 (r) = `2 (r) for all r > 0. Similarly, X1 is smaller than X2 in the usual
stochastic (hazard rate) order, denoted as X1 ≤st X2 (X1 ≤hr X2), if F¯1 (r) ≤ F¯2 (r)
(h1 (r)≤ h2 (r)) for all r. The ≤hr-order implies the ≤mrl-order. However, neither of
the orders ≤st and ≤mrl imply the other.
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3.1.1 Market equilibrium:
Using this terminology, we can express the supplier’s optimal pricing strategy in
terms of the MRL function and formulate sufficient conditions on the demand dis-
tribution, under which a subgame perfect equilibrium exists and is unique.
Theorem 1 ([10]). Assume that the supplier’s belief about the unknown, nonnega-
tive demand parameter, α , is represented by a continuous distribution F, with sup-
port inbetween αL and αH with 0≤ αL < αH ≤ ∞.
(a) If an optimal price r∗ for the supplier exists, then r∗ satisfies the fixed point
equation
r∗ = m(r∗) (1)
(b) If F is strictly DGMRL and Eα2 is finite, then in equilibrium, the optimal price
r∗ of the supplier exists and is the unique solution of (1).
Expressing (1) in terms of the GMRL function `(r), the supplier’s optimal price
r∗ can be equivalently written as the solution of equation `(r∗) = 1.
4 Comparative Statics
The closed form expression of (1) provides the basis for an extensive comparative
statics and sensitivity analysis on the distribution parameters of market demand. To
understand the market-equilibrium behavior under different demand (distribution)
characteristics, we employ (1) and the rich theory of stochastic orders, [14], [7] and
[4]. Based on pii, pis and Theorem 1, the market fundamentals at equilibrium are
given in Table 1.
Notation & Expression Definition
r∗ = m(r∗) wholesale price
q∗ = nn+1 (α− r∗)+ total quantity sold to the market
p∗ = α−q∗ retail price
Π ∗s = nn+1 (α− r∗)+ r∗ realized supplier’s profit
Π ∗i =
( 1
n+1 (α− r∗)+
)2
i−th retailer’s profit, i = 1, . . . ,n
Table 1 Market fundamentals in equilibrium.
Here, Π ∗s refers to the supplier’s realized – not expected – profit, i.e. Π ∗s :=
piS (r∗ | α). From Table 1, it is immediate that the total quantity q∗ that is sold to
the market and the retail price p∗ are monotone in r∗. Accordingly, we restrict at-
tention on the behavior of r∗ as the distribution parameters vary.
To obtain a meaningful comparison between different markets, we assume through-
out equilibrium uniqueness. Hence, unless stated otherwise, we consider only
strictly DGRML distributions with finite second moment. Since the DGMRL is par-
ticulartly inclusive, see [10] and [3] and finiteness of the second moment of the
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demand is naturally to assume, we do not consider them as restrictive. Still, since
these conditions are only sufficient and not necessary, the analysis applies to any
other setting that guarantees equilibrium existence and uniqueness.
4.1 Wholesale Price Determinants:
Although immediate from Theorem 1, the next Lemma showcases the importance
of the characterization in (1). Let X1 and X2 denote two markets (or two instances
of the same market) with demand distributions F1,F2. As stated above, X1,X2 are
assumed to be nonnegative, strictly DGMRL random variables with finite second
moment. We then have
Lemma 1. Let X1,X2 denote the demand in two different market instances. If X1≤mrl
X2, then r∗1 ≤ r∗2.
Proof. Since X1 ≤mrl X2, we have that m1 (r) ≤ m2 (r) for all r > 0, by definition.
Hence, by (1), r∗1 = m(r
∗
1)≤m2 (r∗1), which implies that `2 (r∗1)≥ 1. Since `2 (r) is
strictly decreasing by assumption, this implies that `2 (r)> 1 for all r < r∗1. Since r
∗
2
is the unique solution of `(r∗2) = 1, this in turn implies that r
∗
2 ≥ r∗1.
Hence, the supplier charges a larger wholesale price in a market that is larger in the
≤mrl-order. Based on Lemma 1, the task of studying the behavior of the wholesale
price r∗ largerly reduces to finding sufficient conditions that imply – or that are
equivalent to – the≤mrl-order. Such conditions can be found in [14], and are studied
below.
4.1.1 Re-estimating Demand:
We start with the response of the equilibrium wholesale price r∗ to transformations
that intuitively correspond to a larger market. Let X denote the random demand
in an instance of the market under consideration. Let c ≥ 1 be a positive constant.
Moreover, let Z denote an additional source of demand that is independent of X .
Let r∗X denote the equilibrium wholesale price in the initial market and r∗X+Z the
equilibrium wholesale price in the market with random demand X +Z. How does
r∗X compare to r∗cX and to r∗X+Z?
While the intuition that the larger markets cX and X +Z will give rise to higher
wholesale prices is largely confirmed, see Theorem 2, the results do not hold in full
generality and one needs to pay attention to some technical details. For instance,
since DGMRL random variables are not closed under convolution, see [10], the
random variable X + Z may not be DGMRL. This may lead to a multiplicity of
equilibrium prices in the X +Z instance, irrespectively of whether X is DGMRL or
not. To focus on the economic intepretation of the comparative static analysis and to
avoid an extensive discussion on the technical conditions, we assume that Z is a ran-
dom variable such that the market X +Z has again a unique wholesale equilibrium
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price. However, we consider this assumption as a restriction to the applicability of
statement (ii) of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Let X ∼ F be a nonnegative DGMRL random variable with finite sec-
ond moment which describes the demand distribution in a market instance.
(i) If c≥ 1 is a positive constant, then r∗X ≤ r∗cX .
(ii) If Z is a nonnegative random variable with finite second moment, independent
of X such that X +Z remains strictly DGMRL, then r∗X ≤ r∗X+Z .
Proof. The proof of (i) follows directly from the preservation property of the ≤mrl-
order that is stated Theorem 2.A.11 of [14]. Specifically, since cm(r/c) is the mrl
function of cX , we have that for all > 0
cm(r/c) = r · m(r/c)
r/c
= r · `(r/c)≥ r · `(r) = m(r)
where the inequality follows from the assumption that X is DGMRL. Hence, X ≤mrl
cX which by Lemma 1 implies that r∗X ≤ r∗cX .
Statement (ii) is more involved since r∗X+Z may not be unique in general. How-
ever, under the assumption that X + Z remains strictly DGMRL, we may adapt
Theorem 2.A.11 of [14] and obtain the claim in a similar fashion to part (i). Al-
though Theorem 2.A.11 is stated for DMRL random variables, the proof extends in
a straightforward way to DGMRL random variables.
Another way to treat the possible multiplicity of equilibrium wholesale prices in
the X + Z market and the fact that X + Z may not be DGMRL is the following.
Since, X is strictly DGMRL, we know that r < mX (r) for all r < r∗X1 = mX1
(
r∗X1
)
.
Together with X1 ≤mrl X1 +Z, this implies that for all r < r∗X1 , the following holds:
r < mX1 (r) ≤ mX1+Z (r), and hence that r∗X1+Z ≥ r∗X1 for any r∗X+Z such that (1)
holds. Hence, in this case, we can compare the r∗X with every r∗X+Z separately and
obtain that r∗X is less than any possible equilibrium wholesale price in the market
r∗X+Z . However, as mentioned above, we prefer to restrict attention to markets that
preserve equilibrium uniqueness.
4.1.2 Closure Properties:
Next, we turn our attention to operations that preserve the ≤mrl-order. Let X1,X2
denote two different instances of the market, i.e., two different demand distributions
or beliefs about it, such that X1 ≤mrl X2. In this case, we know that r∗1 ≤ r∗2. We are
interested in determining transformations of X1,X2 that preserve the ≤mrl-order and
hence, by Lemma 1, the ordering r∗1 ≤ r∗2. Again, to avoid technicalities, we assume
that X1,X2 are such that Theorem 1 applies, i.e., that they are nonnegative, strictly
DGMRL and have finite second moment.
Theorem 3. Let X1 ∼ F1,X2 ∼ F2 denote the demand in two different market in-
stances, such that X1 ≤mrl X2. Then,
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(i) If φ is an increasing convex function, then r∗φ(X1) ≤ r∗φ(X2).
(ii) If Z is a nonnegative, IFR random variable with finite second moment, inde-
pendent of X1,X2 such that X1 + Z and X2 + Z remain strictly DGMRL, then
r∗X1+Z ≤ r∗X2+Z .
(iii) If Xp ∼ F1 +(1− p)F2 is strictly DGMRL for some p ∈ (0,1), then r∗X1 ≤ r∗Xp ≤
r∗X2 .
Proof. Statements (i) through (iii) follow directly from Theorems 2.A.19, Lemma
2.A.8 and Theorem 2.A.18 respectively. The assumption that the transformed ran-
dom variables remain strictly DGMRL ensures equilibrium uniqueness.
If instead of X1 ≤mrl X2, X1 and X2 are ordered in the weaker ≤hr-order, i.e., if
X1 ≤hr X2 and Z is DMRL (instead of merely IFR), then Lemma 2.A.10 of [14]
implies that statement (ii) of Theorem 3 remains true. Formally,
Corollary 1. Let X1 ∼ F1,X2 ∼ F2 denote the demand in two different market in-
stances, such that X1 ≤hr X2. If Z is a nonnegative, IFR random variable with finite
second moment, independent of X1,X2 such that X1 +Z and X2 +Z remain strictly
DGMRL, then r∗X1+Z ≤ r∗X2+Z .
Following the exposition of [14], the above collection of statements can be extended
to incorporate more case-specific results.
Although Theorems 2 and 3 are immediate once Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 have
been established, their implications in terms of the economic intuitions are non-
trivial. In particular, both Theorems imply that if the supplier reestimates upwards
her expectations about the demand then she will charge a higher price. However,
this intuitive conclusion depends on the conditions that imply the ≤mrl-order and
does not hold in general, as discussed in Subsection 4.1.4 below.
4.1.3 Market Demand Variability:
The response of the equilibrium wholesale price to increasing (decreasing) demand
variability is less straightforward. There exist several notions of stochastic orders
that compare random variables in terms of their variability and depending on which
we employ, we may derive different results. First, we introduce some notation.
Variability or Dispersive Orders: Let X1 ∼ F1 and X2 ∼ F2 be two nonnegative
random variables with equal means, EX1 = EX2, and finite second moments. If∫ +∞
r F¯1 (u)du ≤
∫ +∞
r F¯2 (u)du for all r ≥ 0, then X1 is said to be smaller than X2
in the convex order, denoted by X1 ≤cx X2. If F−11 and F−12 denote the right continu-
ous inverses of F1,F2 and F−11 (r)−F−11 (s)≤F−12 (r)−F−12 (s) for all 0< r≤ s< 1,
then X1 is said to be smaller than X2 in the dispersive order, denoted by X1 ≤disp X2.
Finally, if
∫ ∞
F−11 (p)
F¯1 (u)du≤
∫ ∞
F−12 (p)
F¯2 (u)du for all p ∈ (0,1), then X1 is said to be
smaller than X2 in the excess wealth order, denoted by X1 ≤ew Y . [14] show that
X ≤disp Y =⇒ X ≤ew Y =⇒ X ≤cx Y which in turn implies that Var(X)≤Var(Y ).
Further insights and motivation about these orders are provided in Chapter 3 of [14].
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Less Variability implies Lower Wholesale Price: Under our assumptions the ≤mrl-
order is not implied by the ≤cx-order. Hence, the ≤cx-order is not enough to con-
clude that wholesale prices are ordered according to the respective market variabil-
ity, i.e., that less (more) variability gives rise to lower (higher) wholesale prices.
However, if we restrict attention to the ≤ew and ≤disp orders, then more can be said.
Recall that αL denotes the left end of the support of a variable X . Accordingly, we
will write αLi to denote the left end of the support of variable Xi for i = 1,2.
Theorem 4. Let X1 ∼ F1,X2 ∼ F2 be two nonnegative, DGMRL random variables
with αL1 ≤ αL2 which denote the demand in two different market instances. If either
X1, X2 or both are DMRL and X1 ≤ew X2, then r∗1 ≤ r∗2.
Theorem 4 follows directly from Theorem 3.C.5 of [14]. Based on its proof, the
assumption that at least one of the two random variables is DMRL (and not merely
DGMRL) cannot be relaxed. [4] argue about the restricted applicability of the ≤ew-
order due to the difficulty in the evaluation of incomplete integrals of quantile func-
tions and provide useful characterizations of the ≤ew-order to remedy this problem.
A result of similar flavor can be obtained if we use the≤disp order instead. Again,
the condition that both X1 and X2 are DGMRL does not suffice and we need to
assume that at least one is IFR.
Theorem 5. Let X1 ∼ F1,X2 ∼ F2 be two nonnegative, DGMRL random variables
which denote the demand in two different market instances. If either X1, X2 or both
are IFR and X1 ≤disp X2, then r∗1 ≤ r∗2.
Theorem 5 follows directly from Theorem 3.B.20 (b) of [14] and the fact that the
≤hr-order implies the ≤mrl-order. Again, more case specific results can be drawn
from the analysis of [14].
The main insight that we get from Theorems 4 and 5 is that less (more) variability
implies lower (higher) wholesale prices. This is in sharp contrast with the results of
[8] and sheds light on the effects of demand uncertainty. If uncertainty affects the
retailer, then the supplier charges a higher price and captures all supply chain profits
as variability reduces. Contrarily, if uncertainty falls to the supplier, then the supplier
charges a lower price as variability increases. In this case, the supplier captures a
lower share of system profit, see also (2) below.
The above cases correspond to two extremes: in [8] uncertainty falls solely to
the retailer, whereas in the present analysis uncertainty falls solely to the supplier.
Based on the aggregate findings for the two cases, the following question naturally
arises: is there a way to distribute demand uncertainty among supplier and retailers
to mitigate its adverse effects and to evenly distribute supply chain profits among
market participants? Answering this question exceeds the scope of the comparative
statics analysis. However, it highlights a interesting direction for future work.
Parametric families of distributions: To further elaborate on the effects of relative
variability on the wholesale price, we may compare our analysis with the approach
of [8]. Given a random variable X with distribution F , [8] consider the random
variables Xi := δi + λiX with δi ≥ 0 and λi > 0 for i = 1,2. They conclude that
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in this case, the wholesale price is dictated by the coefficient of variation, CVi =√
Var(Xi)
EXi . Specifically, if CV2 <CV1, then r
∗
1 < r
∗
2, i.e., in their model, a lower CV,
or equivalently a lower relative variability, implies a higher price.
To establish a similar comparison, we utilize the comprehensive comparison of
parametric distributions in terms of stochastic orders that is provided in Section 2.9
of [4]. For instance, consider two normal random variables X1 ∼ N
(
µ1,σ21
)
and
X2 ∼ N
(
µ2,σ22
)
. By Table 2.2 of [4], if σ1 < σ2 and µ1 ≤ µ2, then X1 ≤mrl X2 and
hence, by Lemma 1, r∗1 < r
∗
2. However, by choosing σi and µi appropriately, we can
achieve an arbitrary ordering of relative variability, i.e. of CV1 and CV2. The reason
is that the conclusions from this approach are obscured by the fact that changing
µi for i = 1,2, does not only affect the CVi’s but also the central location of the
demand distributions. In this sense, the approach using dispersive orders seems more
appropriate because, under the assumption that EX1 = EX2, it isolates the effect of
the variability of the distribution on wholesale prices via stochastic orderings.
4.1.4 Stochastically Larger Market:
It is well known that the usual ≤st-order does not imply nor is implied by the ≤mrl-
order, see [14]. This implies that in a stochastically larger market, the supplier may
still charge a lower price, which is in line with the intuition of [8] that “size is
not everything” and that prices are driven by different forces. Such an example is
provided below. Let
f (r;ω,κ,φ) :=
κ
(
κ2 +ω2
)
κ2 cos(ωφ)+κ2 +κω sin(ωφ)+ω2
· e−κr (cos(ω (r−φ))+1)
for r ≥ 0, denote the densities of a parametric family of exponentially decaying
sinusoids. For (ω,κ,φ) = (0,κ,0), f corresponds to the exponential distribution
with parameter κ . Figure 1 depicts the survival functions F¯ , G¯, the log-survival ra-
tio log
(
F¯/G¯
)
and the optimal wholesaleprices r∗F and r∗G for F corresponding to
(ω,κ,φ) = (pi,0.8,1.2) and G to (ω,κ,φ) = (0,0.9,0). Since the log-survival ra-
tio remains throughout positive, we infer that G ≤st F . However, as shown in the
graph below r∗F = 1.0299 < r∗G = 1.1114. Although, both functions have a unique
fixed point, F is not DMRL (nor DGMRL). Several simulations have not provided
a conclusive answer to whether stochastic dominance implies also a larger price if
we restrict to the DMRL (or DGMRL) class of random variables.
4.2 Supply Chain Performance:
We measure the supply chain performance in terms of the ratio ∑ni=1Π ∗i /Π ∗s which
describes the division of the realized system profit between retailers and suppliers.
If α ≤ r∗, then there is no transaction and the profits of all participants are equal to
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Fig. 1 F stochastically dominates G, however r∗G > r
∗
F .
zero. For α > r∗, we have that
∑ni=1Π ∗i
Π ∗s
=
n
( 1
n+1 (α− r∗)
)2
n
n+1 r
∗ (α− r∗) =
1
n+1
(α
r∗
−1
)
(2)
Hence, the division of realized profit between supplier and retailers depends on the
number n of retailers and the wholesale price r∗. Specifically, for a given realized
demand α , as n or r∗ increase, the supplier captures a larger share of the system
profits.
4.2.1 Supply Chain Efficiency:
As a benchmark, we will first determine the equilibrium behavior and performance
of an integrated supply chain. Let piI denote the profit of an integrated firm. The
integrated firms’ decision variable is now the retail price r, and hence its expected
profit is given by piI (r)= rE(α− r)+ = rm(r) F¯ (r). By the same argument as in the
proof of Theorem 1, piI is maximized at r∗ = m(r∗). In particular, the equilibrium
price of both the integrated and non-integrated supplier is the same. Hence, the
integrated firm’s realized profit in equilibrium is equal toΠ ∗I (r∗ | α) = r∗ (α− r∗)+.
In a similar fashion to [13], we define the realized Price of Anarchy (PoA) of
the system as the worst-case ratio of the realized profit of the centralized supply
chain, Π ∗I , to the realized aggregate profit of the decentralized supply chain, Π ∗D :=
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Π ∗s +∑ni=1Π ∗i . To retain equilibrium uniqueness, we restrict attention to the class G
of nonnegative DGMRL random variables. If the realized demand α is less than r∗,
then both the centralized and decentralized chain make 0 profits. Hence, we define
the PoA as: PoA := supF∈G supα>r∗
Π∗I
Π∗D
. We then have
Theorem 6. The PoA of the system is given by
PoA = 1+O (1/n) (3)
Proof. A direct substitution in the definition of PoA yields:
PoA := sup
F∈G
sup
α>r∗
{
(n+1)2
n
·
(
n+
α
r∗
)−1}
(4)
Since
(
n+ αr∗
)−1 decreases in the ratio α/r∗, the inner sup is attained asymptotically
for α → r∗. Hence, PoA = supF∈G
{
(n+1)2
n · (n+1)−1
}
= 1+ 1n .
Theorem 6 implies that the supply chain becomes less efficient as the number of
downstream retailers increases. Although the PoA provides a useful worst-case sce-
nario, for a fixed F and a realized demand α , it is also of interest to study the re-
sponse of the ratio Π ∗I /Π ∗D to different wholesale prices. Specifically, for any given
value of α , and fixed F , Π ∗I /Π ∗D increases as the wholesale price increases. Hence,
a higher wholesale price corresponds to worst efficiency for the decentralized chain.
Together with the observation that with a higher wholesale price, the supplier
captures a larger share of the system profits, this motivates – from a social per-
spective – the study of mechanisms that will lead to reduced wholesale prices for
fixed demand levels and fixed market characteristics (number of retailers and de-
mand distribution). Such a study falls not within the topic of the present analysis but
constitutes a promising direction for future research.
5 Conclusions
Along with [10], the present study provides a probabilistic and economic analysis
that aims to extend the work of [8], [9], [12] and [3]. The characterization, under
mild conditions, of the supplier’s optimal pricing policy as the unique fixed point of
the MRL function of the demand distribution, provides a powerful tool for a multi-
faceted comparative statics analysis. Theorems 2 and 3 demonstrate how stochastic
orderings, coupled with this characterization, provide predictions of the response
of the wholesale price in a versatile environment of various demand transforma-
tions. Based on a numerical example, Subsection 4.1.4 confirms [8]’s intuition that
prices are driven by different forces than market size. In Subsection 4.2 and Sub-
section 4.2.1, we show that number of second stage retailers and wholesale prices
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have a direct impact on supply chain performance and efficiency. A more extended
version of the present study is subject of ongoing work.
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